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INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, malpractice actions against patent attorneys were
rare. 1 The last two decades brought dramatic changes in this area
of legal malpractice. 2 A recent American Bar Association study
shows a significant increase in the number of filed legal malpractice claims and their severity. 3 Claims against patent attorneys

1

B. Joan Holdridge, Malpractice of Patent Attorneys, 7 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV.
345, 345 (1958). “[T]here are numerous cases in which an attorney’s negligence or incompetence has caused a patentee to lose some of his rights under the law, but very few
in which a patent attorney has actually been sued for malpractice.” Id. at 352.
2
3 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24:24 (2008)
[hereinafter MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE] (noting that before the 1990’s, only
a few malpractice cases were brought against intellectual property attorneys); see also
The Legal Malpractice Climate is Ever Changing, ADVOCATE (Bar Plan Mutual Ins. Co.,
St. Louis, MO), Winter 2006, at 1 [hereinafter The Legal Malpractice Climate].
3
AM. BAR ASS’N, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2000–2003 (noting a major increase in the number of claims settled for more than two million dollars).
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were not an exception. 4 Malpractice has become a serious concern
for patent law practitioners and their insurance providers. 5
While some industry observers attribute the rising severity of
legal malpractice claims to the use of unconventional legal theories
and increasing defense costs, 6 others believe that each area of legal
practice has its own unique problems leading to the increase in
malpractice litigation. 7 Discussing patent-specific reasons, some
legal scholars and commentators point out that over the last two
decades, patents have become more valuable, patent infringement
damages more generous, and patent attorneys’ legal fees increasingly high. 8 For example, in patent infringement litigation that
gave rise to a legal malpractice action of Theis Research, Inc.
(“Theis”) against Brown & Bain, P.A., a California and Arizona
law firm, 9 the court found that the two allegedly infringed claims
of Theis’s patent were invalid, 10 dashing the hopes of the company
and its investors. 11 Theis received no return on years of its re-

4

A. Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice: An Oxymoron No More, 2004 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2004) [hereinafter Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice]
(“[C]ourts have decided at least three times the number of malpractice cases against patent attorneys in the past fourteen years as in the first two hundred years of our federal
patent system.”).
5
See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, The Competency of State Courts to Adjudicate PatentBased Malpractice Claims, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 443, 446 (2006) [hereinafter Seymore, The
Competency of State Courts] (reporting that a significant increase in malpractice insurance premiums for patent attorneys makes it difficult for some patent law firms to find an
insurance provider).
6
The Legal Malpractice Climate, supra note 2, at 1.
7
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 484 (2001).
8
See Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice, supra note 4, at 6–8.
9
Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown & Bain, P.A., 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of the plaintiff’s motion to vacate a zero dollar legal malpractice arbitration award against the law firm of Brown & Bain). In 2004, Brown & Bain, P.A. became
a part of Perkins Coie LLP. See Press Release, Perkins Coie LLP, Perkins Coie LLP and
Brown & Bain, P.A. to Join Forces (June 23, 2004), http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/
news_detail.aspx?news=134.
10
See Brief for Appellant Theis Research, Inc. at 4, Octel Commc’ns Corp. v. Theis
Research, Inc., 12 F. App’x 915 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2000) (No. 00-1031).
11
Octel Commc’ns Corp., 12 F. App’x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming a judgment declaring two Theis’s patent claims infringed and invalid for obviousness); see also Dennis
Crouch, Patent holder barred from reopening malpractice arbitration, Posting to PatentlyO
Patent
Law
Blog
(Nov.
8,
2004,
02:31
PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2004/11/patent_holder_b.html [hereinafter Crouch].
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search work, and Brown & Bain lost millions of dollars it invested
into the case. 12
In this environment, high expectations of clients frustrated by
perceived sub-standard performance of patent attorneys and high
legal fees lead to a larger number of legal malpractice claims in the
patent law area. 13 In addition, attorneys’ actions to recover fees
often result in clients’ counterclaims for legal malpractice. 14
Legal malpractice actions are predominantly state tort and contract law claims even in the cases where the underlying action or
transaction is governed by federal patent law. 15 Nevertheless, the
resolution of a malpractice action may depend on a resolution of a
substantial issue of patent law, 16 which provides a good argument
in favor of exclusive federal jurisdiction over such malpractice actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 17 Until recently, however, federal
courts declined jurisdiction over patent law malpractice actions in
the absence of diversity. 18
12

See Crouch, supra note 11.
See Seymore, The Competency of State Courts, supra note 5, at 444–46.
14
See, e.g., Hill, Van Santen, Steadman & Simpson, P.C. v. Axxess Entry Techs., Inc.,
No. 90 C 3854, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 485, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 1993). In response
to a patent attorney’s action for legal fees, the client filed a two-count legal malpractice
counterclaim alleging professional negligence and breach of contract. See, e.g., Mark
C.S. Bassingthwaighte & Reba J. Nance, The Top Ten Causes of Malpractice—And How
You Can Avoid Them, Presentation at the ABA Techshow 2006 (April 20–22, 2006),
available at http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/tch12062.pdf.
15
See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 8:1 (“Most actions
brought by clients against their attorneys are for negligence, fiduciary breach, breach of
contract or fraud.”). Note that an attorney’s violation of state or U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ethical standards may also lead to malpractice suits. See 2 MALLEN & SMITH,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 20:7. See generally David Hricik, How Things
Snowball: The Ethical Responsibilities and Liability Risks Arising from Representing a
Single Client in Multiple Patent-Related Representations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421
(2005); David Hricik, Trouble Waiting to Happen: Malpractice and Ethical Issues in
Patent Prosecution, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 385 (2003).
16
See, e.g., Seymore, The Competency of State Courts, supra note 5, at 454–55 (noting
that adjudication of some patent malpractice actions implicates complex issues of patent
law and requires understanding of the science and technology involved in the controversy).
17
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006). The statute provides: “The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents . . . . Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent . . .
cases.” Id.
18
See infra Part II.C for a detailed discussion.
13

VOL19_BOOK1_ENA

2008]

12/3/2008 12:16:06 PM

JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES IN PATENT MALPRACTICE

223

Part I of this Comment provides an overview of state law that
governs legal malpractice actions arising from patent prosecution
and litigation. Part II starts with a discussion of the sources of federal jurisdiction followed with a review of the application of the
well-pleaded complaint rule in patent law cases. Part II also examines how courts had treated jurisdictional issues in patent law malpractice cases before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit decided Air Measurement Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP 19 and Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright
& Jaworski, LLP 20 in the fall of 2007. Part III uses the legal background provided in Parts I and II for a detailed analysis of these
two cases where the Federal Circuit held that federal courts have
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over legal malpractice claims
that necessarily depend on a resolution of a substantial question of
patent law. Part III also discusses possible implications of these
Federal Circuit decisions.
I. LEGAL MALPRACTICE IN PATENT CASES: CAUSE OF ACTION
AND APPLICABLE LAW
A. Selecting a Cause of Action
When suing their attorneys, clients can potentially pursue several distinct causes of action including breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of contract, and the tort of professional negligence. 21
While some courts consider claims for breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duty, the tort of legal malpractice (professional negligence), and other tort claims to be distinct causes of action, 22 many
19

Air Measurement Tech., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
20
Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
21
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48–56 (2000); 4
MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8; Ray Ryden Anderson &
Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 235 (1994) [hereinafter Anderson & Steele, Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract].
22
See, e.g., Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that under California law, “breach of fiduciary duty is a species of tort distinct from a
cause of action for professional negligence”); Brownell v. Garber, 503 N.W.2d 81, 87
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that under Michigan law, “fraud is distinct from malprac-
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courts ignore the distinctions and prefer to treat all such actions as
torts for legal malpractice. 23
For example, New York State courts treat legal malpractice actions sounding in contract and those sounding in tort essentially the
same way. 24 To prevail in a legal malpractice action under New
York law, in addition to the existence of an attorney-client relationship at the time of the alleged malpractice, a plaintiff must
show: “(1) the negligence of the attorney; (2) that the negligence
was the proximate cause of the loss sustained; and (3) . . . actual
damages.” 25 In InKine Pharmaceutical Co. v. Coleman, 26 the
plaintiff alleged breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty
claims in addition to legal malpractice claims in a suit against attorneys who failed to timely file a patent application in Asia. 27
The court affirmed dismissal of the breach of contract and breach
of fiduciary duty claims “as duplicative, since they arose from the

tice” since “the interest involved in a claim for damages arising out of a fraudulent misrepresentation differs from the interest involved in a case alleging that a professional
breached the applicable standard of care”).
23
See, e.g., Omlin v. Kaufman & Cumberland Co., 8 F. App’x 477, 479 (6th Cir. 2001)
(“‘[M]alpractice by any other name still constitutes malpractice. . . . It makes no difference whether the professional misconduct is found in tort or contract, it still constitutes
malpractice.’” (applying Ohio law and quoting Muir v. Hadler Real Estate Mgmt. Co.,
446 N.E.2d 820, 822 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982))); see also Limor v. Buerger, 322 B.R. 781,
824, 825 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 2005) (“Under Tennessee law, the statute of limitations for
‘actions and suits against attorneys . . . for malpractice, whether the actions are grounded
or based in contract or tort’ is one year.” (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (2005)));
Anderson & Steele, Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract, supra note 21, at 235, 240 n.3
(noting that regardless of the alleged cause of action, courts often treat claims of clients
for misbehavior of their attorneys as tort actions for malpractice); Mitchell L. Lathrop,
The Exposure of the Patent Attorney to Claims for Legal Malpractice: The New Frontier,
3 AIPLA Q.J. 221, 226 (1975) [hereinafter Mitchell L. Lathrop, The Exposure of the Patent Attorney] (noting that “[t]he traditional distinction between [legal malpractice] actions
sounding in contract and those sounding in tort are rapidly becoming blurred and, in
some jurisdictions, obliterated altogether”). For a detailed discussion of the legal malpractice cause of action, see generally 23 CAUSES OF ACTION 589 (West 2007).
24
For a detailed discussion of New York legal malpractice law, see N.Y. JUR. 2d §§
37–80 (West 2008).
25
Murphy v. Stein, 549 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55 (App. Div. 1989) (citing Mendoza v.
Schlossman, 448 N.Y.S.2d 45, 46 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)); see also Marshall v. Nacht,
569 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
26
InKine Pharm. Co. v. Coleman, 759 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. Div. 2003).
27
Id. at 63.
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same facts as the legal malpractice claim and allege[d] similar
damages.” 28
In contrast, under California law, claims against an attorney
may include professional negligence, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud, infliction of emotional distress, and other tort
claims. 29 Although California and New York courts define elements of a malpractice cause of action in a similar way, California
courts allow a malpractice plaintiff to assert other causes of action
arising from an attorney’s malfeasance. 30 For example, in
Rosenberg v. Hillshafer, 31 the court permitted a former client to
assert claims of legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress against her attorney
and attorney’s law firm. 32 In Wolk v. Green, 33 a diversity case under California law, the court allowed the plaintiff to sue her former
attorney for “legal malpractice, extortion, misrepresentation,
breach of fiduciary duty, willful misconduct, breach of contract,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, infliction of emotional
distress, elder fraud abuse and unjust enrichment.” 34
Malpractice claims based on a breach of fiduciary duty involve
allegations of an attorney’s breach of a duty of confidentiality and
undivided loyalty owed to the client.35 Such claims often arise in a
conflict of interest context where a patent attorney or a law firm

28

Id.; see also Ciocca v. Neff, No. 02 Civ. 5067, 2005 WL 1473819, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
June 22, 2005) (dismissing a breach of contract and a promissory estoppel claims as redundant under New York law in a legal malpractice case).
29
See, for example, CAL. CIV. PRAC. TORTS § 33:1 (2008) and cases cited therein.
30
See, e.g., Kairos Scientific Inc. v. Fish & Richardson, P.C., Nos. A107085, A107086,
2006 WL 171921, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2006) (“A cause of action for legal malpractice requires evidence of the following four elements: ‘(1) the duty of the attorney to
use such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of his or her profession commonly
possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from
the attorney’s negligence.’” (quoting Coscia v. McKenna Cuneo, 25 P.3d 670, 672 (Cal.
2001))); see also CAL. CIV. PRAC. TORTS § 33:1, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
31
Rosenberg v. Hillshafer, No. B191950, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9454 (Cal.
Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2007).
32
Id. at *1.
33
Wolk v. Green, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
34
Id. at 1127.
35
See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 15:2.
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represents clients with adverse interests. 36 For example, in G.D.
Searle & Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 37 former law firm clients,
G.D. Searle & Co., Inc. (“Searle”), Pfizer, Inc. (“Pfizer”), and the
University of Rochester, alleged a breach of fiduciary duty claiming that the law firm made simultaneous adverse representations on
their respective behalves with regards to the same technology—
COX-2 inhibitors. 38 Some jurisdictions only prohibit multiple representations with actual adversity among clients; in New York,
however, this prohibition reaches representations with even the appearance of impropriety and conflict of interest. 39
The choice of legal theory and court’s categorization of the action can affect the outcome of the case. 40 For example, the statute
of limitations period for tort claims may differ from that for contract claims. 41 In Hutchinson v. Smith, 42 the Supreme Court of
Mississippi reversed dismissal of a legal malpractice action as
barred by a three-year statute of limitations for unwritten contracts
and held that the malpractice action sounded in tort and the sixyear statute of limitations for tort actions applied. 43 The Supreme
Court of Hawaii, on the other hand, held that, for the purposes of
36

See generally David Hricik, The Risks and Responsibilities of Attorneys and Firms
Prosecuting Patents for Different Clients in Related Technologies, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 331 (2000).
37
G.D. Searle & Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds LLP, No. 602374/00, 2004 N.Y. Slip Op.
51874U (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2004).
38
Id. at *2. Pfizer alleged, inter alia, that in 1998 Pennie & Edmonds partners, Paul De
Stefano and Laura A. Coruzzi, who represented the University of Rochester, failed to respond to an internal “conflicts memo” with regards to Searle’s retention of the firm in
COX-2 patent matters, and that they drafted the University’s patent specifically to cover
drugs Pfizer and Searle were about to start marketing. Id. Within a month after this decision, in a patent infringement action of the University of Rochester against Searle, the
Federal Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for Searle, declaring the University’s patent procured by Pennie & Edmonds invalid “for failure to meet the written description
and enablement requirements.” Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916,
919 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A few months later, the law firm settled the malpractice case. See
Docket for Pennie & Edmonds, No. 602374/00, 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 51874U.
39
Pennie & Edmonds, 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 51874U, at *1 (quoting In re Hof, 478
N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)).
40
4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8; Anderson & Steele,
Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract, supra note 21, at 235.
41
4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8.
42
Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926 (Miss. 1982).
43
Id. at 929–30.
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the statute of limitations, all legal malpractice actions are actions in
contract and reversed dismissal of the action under the shorter statute of limitations for torts. 44
In Omlin v. Kaufman & Cumberland Co., 45 the court treated
plaintiff’s contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and tort claims
against her former attorneys as a single legal malpractice claim. 46
Thus, the Omlin court affirmed dismissal of the claim as barred by
the one-year Ohio malpractice statute of limitations 47 because the
plaintiff did not file her claim within one year from the termination
of her attorney-client relationship with the defendant attorney. 48
The pleaded cause of action may also affect the availability of
prejudgment interest, punitive damages, or a contributory negligence defense. For example, the plaintiff can recover prejudgment
interest in contract but not in tort claims, while contributory negligence defense and punitive damages are only available in tort actions. 49 In addition, compared to a malpractice action sounding in
contract that is only available to a plaintiff who is in privity of contract with the defendant, the permissible category of plaintiffs may
be significantly wider for a malpractice action sounding in tort. 50
The pleaded cause of action and the relief sought may also determine the availability of attorney fees in a legal malpractice action. For example, in Helfand v. Gerson, 51 decided under Hawaiian law, former clients sued their attorney and his law firm alleging
negligence, breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, and legal malpractice. 52 Since at least two of the four alleged causes of action sounded in contract and because the plaintiffs sought to recover attorney fees available in actions in the
nature of the assumpsit, 53 but not in tort actions, 54 the Ninth Cir44

Higa v. Mirikitani, 517 P.2d 1, 3–6 (Haw. 1973).
Omlin v. Kaufman & Cumberland Co., 8 F. App’x 477 (6th Cir. 2001).
46
Id. at 479.
47
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
48
Omlin, 8 F. App’x 477, 479 (6th Cir. 2001).
49
See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8.
50
See Mitchell L. Lathrop, The Exposure of the Patent Attorney, supra note 23, at 228–
31 (discussing liability of patent attorneys to non-clients).
51
Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1997).
52
Id. at 533–34, 537.
53
Id. at 537 (“Assumpsit is a common law form of action which allows for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a contract, either express or implied, written
45
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cuit held that the plaintiffs’ action was in the nature of the assumpsit and affirmed the award of attorney fees to the defendants who
prevailed in the court below. 55
B. Choice of Law Issues
When a legal malpractice action arises from acts or omissions
that occurred in more than one state, the availability of a particular
liability theory may depend on which law governs the underlying
action and the malpractice action itself. 56 On the other hand, the
choice of law may depend on the plaintiff’s selection of a legal
theory. 57 For example, some states use different choice of law
rules for tort and contract claims. 58 Therefore, a plaintiff’s decision to frame a legal malpractice action as a contract claim, as opposed to a tort claim, may result in the application of law of a different state. 59
To determine which choice of law rules apply to a legal malpractice action, the court may also have to determine whether conflicting laws are substantive or procedural, since the law of the forum usually governs procedural issues, while the forum’s choice of

or verbal, as well as quasi contractual obligations.” (citing Schulz v. Honsador, Inc., 690
P.2d 279, 281 (Haw. 1984))).
54
See id. at 536–38; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 607–14 (2008) (“In all the courts, in
all actions in the nature of assumpsit . . . there shall be taxed as attorneys’ fees, to be paid
by the losing party and to be included in the sum for which execution may issue, a fee
that the court determines to be reasonable . . . .”).
55
See Helfand, 105 F.3d 530, 538–39 (9th Cir. 1997).
56
See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8.
57
See, e.g., Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir.
1983) (applying California choice of law rules).
The first step in choice of law analysis is to ascertain the nature of the
problem involved, i.e. is the specific issue at hand a problem of the
law of contracts, torts, property, etc. The second step is to determine
what choice of law rule the state of California applies to that type of
legal issue. The third step is to apply the proper choice of law rule to
the instant facts and thereby conclude which state’s substantive law
applies.
Id.
58
See id.
59
For example, Florida uses the traditional choice of law rule for contract cases and
modern “most significant relationship” methodology for tort cases. See infra notes 74–75
and accompanying text.
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law rules determine which law applies to substantive issues. 60 A
federal court sitting in diversity or exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state claims applies choice of law rules of the forum
state. 61 If a district court transfers such action to another district
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the transferee court applies the
substantive law, including choice of law rules, of the state in which
the transferor court sits. 62 For example, in First Trust N.A. v.
Moses & Singer, 63 a legal malpractice case transferred from the
Southern District of Mississippi to the Southern District of New
York, the court applied Mississippi substantive law and choice of
law rules. 64
Attorneys and their clients can contractually define which law
governs actions arising from a breach of the retainer agreement,
including malpractice claims. 65 Otherwise, if the acts that gave
rise to a malpractice action against the attorneys occurred in several states, the court will have to decide which law applies. 66 First,
the court will determine if there is a true conflict between relevant
laws of the jurisdictions involved. 67 Only if a true conflict exists,
will the court use its choice of law rules to resolve that conflict. 68

60

See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8.
See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (“The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those
prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.”); Paracor Fin., Inc. v. GE Capital Corp., 96 F.3d
1151, 1164 (1996) (“In a federal question action where the federal court is exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, the federal court applies the choice-of-law
rules of the forum state . . . .”).
62
See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990) (holding that a § 1404(a)
venue transfer should not deprive parties of state-law advantages of the transferor court
forum state regardless of which party initiated the transfer); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612, 639 (1964) (“A change of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms.”).
63
First Trust N.A. v. Moses & Singer, No. 99 Civ. 1947, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10957
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000).
64
Id. at *10.
65
See, e.g., Expansion Pointe Props. L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch,
LLP, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that choice of law provisions in a retainer agreement were enforceable in a legal malpractice action of a former
client against its attorneys).
66
See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:8.
67
Id.
68
Id.
61
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Jurisdictions that adhere to the traditional approach in deciding
choice of law questions apply the law of the place where injury occurred for tort claims, 69 the law of the place of contract for claims
arising from the formation of the contract, 70 and the law of the
place of performance for contract claims arising from the performance of the contract. 71
Many jurisdictions abandoned the traditional choice of law rule
in favor of the “most significant relationship” approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and other modern choice
of law methodologies for tort 72 and contract cases. 73 In some
69

See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) (for tort claims “[t]he
law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury”); see
also Dowis v. Mud Slingers, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 413, 419 (Ga. 2005) (reaffirming Georgia’s
adherence to the traditional choice of law rule in tort cases); Simon v. United States, 805
N.E.2d 798, 804–07 (Ind. 2004) (reaffirming Indiana’s adherence to the traditional choice
of law rule in tort cases); Michael Ena, Note, Choice of Law and Predictability of Decisions in Products Liability Cases, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1417, 1420–25 (2007) (discussing application of the traditional choice of law rule in tort cases). The traditional choice
of law rule that prescribes use of the law of the place of injury is also known as lex loci
delicti. Id. at 1420.
70
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934) (“The law of the place
of contracting determines the validity and effect of a promise . . . .”). This rule is also
known as lex loci contractus. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So. 2d
1160, 1163 (Fla. 2006) (stating that the rule of lex loci contractus “provides that the law
of the jurisdiction where the contract was executed governs the rights and liabilities of the
parties . . . .”). See generally E.H. Schopler, What Law Governs in Determining Whether
Facts and Circumstances Operate to Terminate, Breach, Rescind, or Repudiate a Contract, 50 A.L.R.2d 254 (2008).
71
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 358 (1934) (“The duty for the
performance of which a party to a contract is bound will be discharged by compliance
with the law of the place of performance . . . .”).
72
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (“The rights and
liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of
the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties . . . .”); see also First Trust N.A. v. Moses & Singer, No. 99 Civ.
1947, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10957, at *10–18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000) (applying Mississippi “most significant relationship” choice of law methodology to a legal malpractice
claim); Ena, supra note 69, at 1428–30 (discussing application of the modern “most significant relationship” choice of law methodology in tort cases).
73
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 186–88 (1971) (“Issues in
contract are determined by the law chosen by the parties . . . ,” otherwise “[t]he rights and
duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of
the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties . . . .”); see also Hill, Van Santen, Steadman & Simpson, P.C.
v. Axxess Entry Techs., Inc., No. 90 C 3854, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 485, at *3–5 (N.D.
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states, however, the applicable choice of law methodology depends
on the court’s characterization of the action. For example, Florida
uses the traditional rule in contract cases 74 and the modern “most
significant relationship” methodology in tort cases. 75 Therefore,
the court’s choice of law decision may depend on whether a malpractice claim sounds in tort or in contract.
C. Proving Causation and Damages:“Case Within a Case” and
Related Jurisdictional Issues
Most of malpractice claims against patent practitioners arise
from missed filing dates, breaches of fiduciary duty, and errors in
litigation. 76 Legal malpractice claims involving substantive errors
in patent work are relatively rare. 77 Although the technical sophistication of the patent law practice increases chances for attorney
mistakes, only in a few reported instances have clients realized or
proven that their patent attorneys made a substantive error and that
the error was a proximate cause of the client’s damages. 78 Patent
prosecution errors usually surface during subsequent patent infringement litigation or licensing negotiations. 79 By that time, a

Ill. Jan. 19, 1993) (applying Illinois’s “most significant relationship” choice of law methodology to tort and contract legal malpractice counterclaims of a former client against its
attorneys); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2006:
Nineteenth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 697, 713 (2006) (reporting that by 2006,
only ten U.S. states still adhered to the traditional choice of law rule in tort cases, and
only twelve states applied it in contract cases).
74
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d at 1163–64 (reaffirming Florida’s
adherence to the traditional choice of law rule in contract cases).
75
See Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980) (adopting
the “most significant relationship” approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws for tort cases).
76
3 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 24:24; see also Mark
Hancock, Malpractice Cases Based on a Missed Patent Filing (June 15, 2006),
http://www.sdma.com/Publications/detail.aspx?pub=4405.
77
3 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 24:24.
78
Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice, supra note 4, at 2–3.
79
See, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP,
504 F.3d 1262, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (clients discovered errors in patent prosecution during subsequent patent infringement litigation); Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (clients discovered errors in patent prosecution during subsequent licensing negotiations). See infra Part III for a detailed
discussion of these two cases.
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legal malpractice action may be barred by the statute of limitations. 80
To adjudicate a malpractice claim, the court has to evaluate the
underlying action or transaction that gave rise to the malpractice
claim. 81 The most common approach is to implement the “case
within a case” concept where the outcome of the legal malpractice
action depends on the outcome of the underlying case that was
never tried or was not tried properly because of the alleged malpractice. 82 Effectively, the court re-tries the underlying case as a
part of the malpractice action to determine if the malpractice plaintiff would have been successful or “what should have happened”
but for the attorney’s malpractice. 83
For example, in U.S. Cosmetics Corp. v. Greenberg Traurig,
LLP, 84 the plaintiffs alleged that Greenberg Traurig, LLP improperly entered into an unauthorized settlement while representing the
plaintiffs in a patent infringement action. 85 The court found that
the plaintiffs failed to show that they complied with the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) to consistently mark substantially all of
the patented product by printing the word “patent” or “pat.” and

80

See, e.g., Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1289 (holding that the legal malpractice action
was barred by the statute of limitations).
81
See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:11.
82
For a detailed discussion of the concept of a “case within a case,” often referred to as
a “trial within a trial” or “lawsuit within a lawsuit,” see 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:11–:12; John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal of the Crumbling Dike and the Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L. REV.
1127, 1129–30 (1988) [hereinafter Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice]; Seymore,
The Competency of State Courts, supra note 5, at 455–58; see also Katsaris v. Scelsi, 453
N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (“A legal malpractice action may be described as
a ‘lawsuit within a lawsuit.’ A plaintiff must prove the attorney failed to exercise reasonable care, and also that the plaintiff would have been successful in the underlying action
if the attorney had performed properly.” (citing Parksville Mobile Modular, Inc. v. Fabricant, 422 N.Y.S.2d 710, 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979))).
83
See, e.g., Ocean Ships, Inc. v. Stiles, 315 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where malpractice is shown to have affected the proceedings, the inquiry shifts to what would have
happened if the claim had been decided in the absence of malpractice.”). For a detailed
discussion, see 4 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 34:11–:12.
84
U.S. Cosmetics Corp. v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, No. 04-CV-3697, 2007 WL
980148 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2007).
85
Id. at *1.
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the number of the patent on it.86 Since the plaintiffs did not show
that they would have prevailed or reached a better settlement in the
underlying infringement action but for the law firm’s alleged negligence, the court granted a summary judgment for the defendant
law firm. 87
Courts have held that to recover in a malpractice case, the
plaintiff must prove actual damages resulted from the alleged malpractice. 88 For example, in Sherwood Group, Inc. v. Dornbush,
Mensch, Mandelstam & Silverman, 89 the court granted summary
judgment to the defendant law firm since plaintiff’s allegations of
damages were highly speculative, and the plaintiff failed to show
any actual damages. 90
In a patent prosecution context, a malpractice plaintiff has to
show that a patent with a certain commercial value would have issued or that the issued patent would have been more valuable but
for the alleged malpractice. 91 In Igen, Inc. v. White, 92 where the
plaintiff alleged that it suffered $150 million in damages because
the defendant patent law firm negligently failed to timely file a
patent application in Europe, a New York appellate court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action since the
plaintiff could not show any actual harm. 93
In a more recent case, the same court held that the trier of fact
could find a diminution of value of a worldwide license to manufacture, sell, and sublicense a patented pharmaceutical product

86

Id. at *2–4 (explaining that to satisfy the constructive notice provision of 35 U.S.C. §
287(a), the patentee must show that substantially all of the patented product being distributed was marked and the marking was substantially consistent and continuous (citing
Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).
87
Id. at *5.
88
3 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 24:24.
89
Sherwood Group, Inc. v. Dornbush, Mensch, Mandelstam & Silverman, 594
N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
90
Id. at 768.
91
See, e.g., Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice, supra note 4, at 44–45.
92
Igen, Inc. v. White, 672 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
93
Id. at 869. The court noted: “Plaintiff, the inventor of a technique for producing
monoclonal antibodies, seeks to wrest from its former counsel something that, thus far,
has eluded it in the marketplace—a monetary return from its patented process.” Id. at
868.

VOL19_BOOK1_ENA

234

12/3/2008 12:16:06 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:219

where the defendant law firm failed to timely file a patent application in Asia. 94
In Kairos Scientific Inc. v. Fish & Richardson, P.C., 95 decided
under California law, the plaintiff managed to show that defendant
law firm’s negligent failure to timely file a Patent Cooperation
Treaty (“PCT”) application caused the plaintiff thirty million dollars in damages, mostly in licensing fees and royalties, because the
issued patent provided protection only in Canada and the United
States. 96
In addition to proving a favorable judgment in the underlying
case, the court may require a malpractice plaintiff to show that the
judgment would have been collectible 97 and no other remedies remained available against the underlying defendant. 98 For example,
in Garretson v. Harold I. Miller, 99 a California appellate court affirmed a judgment for the defendant attorney in a legal malpractice
case where the plaintiff client failed to establish that a favorable
judgment in the underlying case would have been collectible. 100
The outcome of a “case within a case” in a patent-related legal
malpractice action may turn on a substantial issue of patent law,
which inevitably raises jurisdictional questions related to the congressional grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent
claims. 101 For example, in Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foley &
Lardner LLP, 102 the plaintiff, Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc.
(“Vaxiion”), alleged that Foley & Lardner (“Foley”) attorneys,
94

InKine Pharm. Co. v. Coleman, 759 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
Kairos Scientific Inc. v. Fish & Richardson, P.C., No. 415736, 2003 WL 21960687
(Cal. Super. Ct. July 29, 2003), aff’d, Nos. A107085 & A107486, 2006 WL 171921 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2006) (reducing the award by 1.3 million dollars and affirming the
modified judgment).
96
Id. at *19–20, *77.
97
For a detailed discussion of the requirement of collectibility, see Bauman, Damages
for Legal Malpractice, supra note 82, at 1135–38.
98
Id. at 1138–40.
99
Garretson v. Harold I. Miller, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
100
Id. at 326. “California follows the majority rule that a malpractice plaintiff must
prove not only negligence on the part of his or her attorney but that careful management
of the case-within-a-case would have resulted in a favorable judgment ‘and collection of
same.’” Id. at 321 (citing Campbell v. Magana, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32, 33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960)).
101
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
102
Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner LLP, No. 07CV280, 2008 WL
538446 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2008).
95
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who prosecuted Vaxiion’s patent application, after filing a provisional application in the United States on May 24, 2001, failed to
timely file an international application under the PCT. 103 According to Vaxiion, the filing deadline for the PCT application was
May 24, 2002, the day before the Memorial Day weekend. 104
Foley & Lardner filed the PCT application on the next business
day, May 28, 2002. 105 Therefore, Vaxiion could only claim priority from a revised provisional application filed nine months
later. 106 Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Vaxiion, another group of
Foley & Lardner attorneys filed United States and PCT patent applications for EnGene, a Vaxiion competitor. 107 Vaxiion claimed
that the competitor’s applications covered the same intellectual
property as one of its divisional patent applications, and thus, limited Vaxiion’s patent protection to the United States. 108
Foley argued that to prove causation and damages, Vaxiion had
to show that a valid, enforceable, and more valuable international
patent would have issued had the application been filed timely. 109
Defendants also claimed that the court had to conduct an interference proceeding with regards to the claim scope, patentability, and
priority of the competing patent applications to determine whether
EnGene’s and Vaxiion’s patent applications cover the same subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 291 and § 135. 110 Therefore, according
to Foley, the outcome of the “case within a case” depended on substantial issues of patent law, and the federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the case despite the absence of
103

Id. at *1.
See id.; Defendant Foley & Lardner LLP’s Opposition to Plaintiff Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc.’s Motion to Remand at 2, Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446 (No.
07CV280), 2007 WL 4596888 [hereinafter Foley’s Opposition to the Motion to Remand].
105
Foley’s Opposition to the Motion to Remand, supra note 104, at 2.
106
See Notice of Motion for Remand at 2, Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446 (No.
07CV280), 2007 WL 4597081 [hereinafter Vaxiion’s Motion for Remand]. Vaxiion
learned of EnGene’s patent applications when EnGene offered Vaxiion a cross-licensing
agreement. Id. at 2–3.
107
See Vaxiion’s Motion for Remand, supra note 106, at 2–3.
108
See Foley’s Opposition to the Motion to Remand, supra note 104, at 2. Vaxiion had
to split its original patent application into twenty-three divisional applications because of
a restriction requirement. See Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446, at *1.
109
See Foley’s Opposition to the Motion to Remand, supra note 104, at 5.
110
Id. at 6–9.
104

VOL19_BOOK1_ENA

236

12/3/2008 12:16:06 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:219

diversity between the parties. 111 The court agreed with the defendants and held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case. 112
Although there are good arguments in favor of exclusive federal jurisdiction over such malpractice actions under 28 U.S.C. §
1338, 113 as discussed in Part II, until recently, federal courts declined jurisdiction in such cases in the absence of diversity of citizenship between the parties. Part II also provides a background for
the Part III analysis of recent Federal Circuit decisions in Air
Measurement Technologies 114 and Immunocept. 115
II. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PATENT LAW MALPRACTICE CASES
A. Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
Subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is based on a federal subject matter 116 or diversity of citizenship. 117 It derives from
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which delineates the
outer limits of federal subject matter jurisdiction.118 Congress
adopted enabling statutes that define actual jurisdiction of federal
courts. 119 Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts

111

Id. at 9.
See generally Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446. For a further discussion of
this case, see infra notes 189–96 and accompanying text .
113
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
114
Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
115
Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
116
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
117
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States . . . .”); see also
1-1 FEDERAL LITIGATION GUIDE § 1.05 (Lexis 2007) (discussing constitutional and statutory basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction).
118
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968) (“The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of the Constitution.”).
119
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330–69, 1441–53; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974)
(noting that federal subject matter “[j]urisdiction is essentially the authority conferred by
Congress to decide a given type of case . . . .”).
112
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cannot be extended through judicial interpretation, state laws and
regulations, or by consent of the parties. 120
The Supreme Court interpreted the “arising under” language of
§ 1331 to confer narrower jurisdiction on federal courts than the
identical “arising under” language of Article III of the Constitution. 121 For a claim to arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint
must be based on a cause of action created by federal law or the relief sought must necessarily depend on a resolution of a substantial
question of federal law. 122 Plaintiffs cannot defeat or confer federal jurisdiction though the drafting of artful pleadings. 123
Generally, state law-based actions, such as legal malpractice
cases, with the requisite amount in controversy and diverse parties,
are within concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts. 124
With a few exceptions, if filed in a state court, defendants may remove such cases to federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. §
1441. 125
If a federal court has proper original jurisdiction over a civil
case, it has supplemental jurisdiction over all state law claims aris120
See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17–18 (1951) (“The jurisdiction
of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation or
by prior action or consent of the parties.”).
121
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1983) (“Although the
language of § 1331 parallels that of the ‘Arising Under’ Clause of Art. III, this Court
never has held that statutory ‘arising under’ jurisdiction is identical to Art. III ‘arising
under’ jurisdiction. Quite the contrary is true.”).
122
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127–28 (1974); see also
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (holding that “the
question whether a claim ‘arises under’ federal law must be determined by reference to
the ‘well-pleaded complaint’” and that “[a] defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction”).
123
See Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 (1981) (“[C]ourts ‘will
not permit plaintiff to use artful pleading to close off defendant’s right to a federal forum
. . . [and] occasionally the removal court will seek to determine whether the real nature of
the claim is federal, regardless of plaintiff’s characterization.’” (quoting 14 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722 (1976))).
124
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(1) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States . . . .”).
125
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Nonremovable actions are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1445 and are
not relevant in the legal malpractice context.
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ing from the same case or controversy. 126 The court, however,
may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over a particular claim. 127
Some types of claims, such as those arising under patent laws,
are within exclusive original jurisdiction of federal courts, and
state courts lack jurisdiction to hear such matters. 128
B. Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule and Federal Jurisdiction in
Patent Cases
In 1982, to ensure uniformity in the development and application of patent law, Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. 129 The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over any final decision of a federal district court where
the court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338, over appeals from decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”), and over appeals from district court decisions on
appeals from BPAI decisions. 130

126

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The statute provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution.

Id.
127

See 28 U.S.C.. § 1367(c). The statute provides:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim under subsection (a) if—(1) the claim raises a novel or
complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates
over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there
are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

Id.
128
129
130

See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (4).
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Congress intended to circumscribe clearly the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit by the reference to § 1338. 131 In
practice, however, this created two jurisdictional conflicts, one between the Federal Circuit and state courts and the other one between the Federal Circuit and other circuit courts. 132 The Supreme
Court attempted to clarify the issue in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. 133 Applying the well-pleaded complaint rule
that it used to interpret the scope of federal jurisdiction under Section 1331, the Court held:
[Section] 1338(a) jurisdiction [of the Federal Circuit] likewise extend[s] only to those cases in which
a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal patent
law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one
of the well-pleaded claims. 134
The Court also explained that if several alternative theories
support a claim, there is no federal patent law jurisdiction unless a
patent law question is essential for each of the theories.135
Concerned that the Federal Circuit interpreted its “arising under” jurisdiction and the well-pleaded complaint rule too
broadly, 136 in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys131

See Emmette F. Hale, III, The “Arising Under” Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit:
An Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 238–41
(1986).
132
In a jurisdictional conflict between the Federal Circuit and a state court, the court has
to determine whether a particular claim falls under the exclusive jurisdictional grant of 28
U.S.C. § 1338. In a jurisdictional conflict that implicates appellate jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit and a regional circuit court, the court has to decide whether the district
court where the appeal originated from had original subject matter jurisdiction under §
1338 or under some other source of federal jurisdiction. For a detailed treatment of these
issues, see John Donofrio & Edward C. Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.: The Application of Federal Question Precedent to Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1835 (1996) [hereinafter Donofrio & Donovan, The
Application of Federal Question Precedent].
133
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
134
Id. at 808–09.
135
Id. at 810.
136
For a theoretical basis for such an interpretation, see, for example, Donofrio &
Donovan, The Application of Federal Question Precedent, supra note 132.
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tems, Inc., 137 the Supreme Court held that the well-pleaded complaint rule does not allow a counterclaim for patent infringement to
serve as a basis for the exclusive appellate jurisdiction under §
1295(a)(1). 138 The Court was concerned that a broad interpretation
of the “arising under” jurisdiction would destroy a plaintiff’s control over removal jurisdiction and the appellate forum for the claim
and would unnecessarily complicate the application of the wellpleaded complaint doctrine. 139
One of the consequences of the Holmes decision is that regional circuits and state courts have to decide more patent law
claims. Some commentators expressed concern that this may have
a negative impact on the uniformity in the application of patent
law—the same concern that led to the creation of the Federal Circuit. 140
Three years later, in Grable and Sons Metal Products, Inc. v.
Darue Engineering and Manufacturing, 141 the Supreme Court cautioned that “[a] federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal
forum only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional
judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts . . . .” 142 According to the Court, “federal jurisdiction
demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one,
indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages
thought to be inherent in a federal forum.” 143 Thus, to determine
existence of federal “arising under” jurisdiction, courts have to answer the following question: “[D]oes a state-law claim necessarily
raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which
a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congression-

137

Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
Id. at 830–31.
139
Id. at 831–32.
140
See, e.g., C.J. Alice Chen, Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems,
Inc., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 141, 157 (2003); Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims,
the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and Federal Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 50 (2004);
Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 253, 311 (2003).
141
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
142
Id. at 313.
143
Id.
138
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ally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities?” 144
The federal jurisdictional framework discussed in this section
informed federal and state court jurisdictional rulings examined below and formed the basis for the two Federal Circuit decisions discussed in Part III.
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Patent Law Malpractice
Cases Before the Federal Circuit Decisions in Air
Measurement 145 and Immunocept 146
Traditionally, federal courts found no jurisdiction in legal malpractice cases absent diversity of citizenship. 147 As discussed in
Part I, the outcome of some patent law malpractice cases may depend on a substantial question of patent law. Nevertheless, since
such cases arise under state law, in compliance with the wellpleaded complaint rule and the Supreme Court decisions in
Christianson and Holmes, in the absence of diversity, federal
courts declined jurisdiction over patent law malpractice claims. 148
For example, in Adamasu v. Gifford, Krass, Groh, Sprinkle,
Anderson & Citkowski, P.C., 149 where the plaintiff sued patent attorneys in a state court for the alleged legal malpractice in patent
prosecution, the defendants did not succeed in their attempt to remove the case to a federal court.150 The prosecution history of the
patent in question was long and involved several continuation, con-

144

Id. at 314.
Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
146
Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
147
See, e.g., Commonwealth Film Processing, Inc. v. Moss & Rocovich, P.C., 778 F.
Supp. 283 (W.D. Va. 1991) (no federal jurisdiction in a legal malpractice action against
patent attorney who allegedly failed to demonstrate adequate knowledge of patent law);
Voight v. Kraft, 342 F. Supp. 821 (D. Idaho 1972) (no federal jurisdiction in a legal malpractice action where the defendant attorneys allegedly advised the plaintiff to pursue a
patent for a device that was not patentable).
148
See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the well-pleaded complaint rule and the Supreme Court decisions in Christianson and Holmes.
149
Adamasu v. Gifford, Krass, Groh, Sprinkle, Anderson & Citkowski, P.C., No. 0570389, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37769 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 2005).
150
Id. at *11.
145

VOL19_BOOK1_ENA

242

12/3/2008 12:16:06 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:219

tinuation in part, and divisional applications. 151 The plaintiff filed
the original patent application in November 1982. 152 In an attempt
to qualify for a patent duration of seventeen years from the date of
issue and effectively extend the life of the patent, on June 7, 1995,
the plaintiff filed a patent application that claimed priority from his
November 1982 application. 153 In December 1996, the PTO rejected the new application and seven months later declared the application abandoned for failure to respond to the rejection. 154 In
2000, the plaintiff retained the defendant attorneys to revive the
1995 patent application. 155 The defendants filed a petition for revival under 37 C.F.R. § 1.137(b), requisite terminal disclaimer, and
a Continued Prosecution Application Request Transmittal under 37
C.F.R. § 1.53(d). 156 The PTO granted the petition to revive “solely
for the purposes of continuity” and deemed the 1995 application
abandoned in favor of the continued prosecution application filed
in 2000. 157 As a result, according to the plaintiff, the patent that
issued in 2001 had the duration of twenty years from the date of
filing of his earliest application in 1982. 158 The plaintiff also
151

See U.S. Patent No. 6,314,368, at [62] (filed June 7, 1995).
Id. at [62].
153
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (2006) (“[T]he term of a patent . . . that results
from an application filed [before June 8, 1995] shall be the greater of the 20-year term
[from the filing of the original application], or 17 years from grant, subject to any terminal disclaimers.”). The June 8, 1995, deadline resulted from the United States acceding
to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”) Agreement in
1994, which required that “[t]he term of [patent] protection available shall not end before
the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.” Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 33, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 229, 33 I.L.M. 1197, available at http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/
27-trips.pdf; see also Uruguay Round Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 531, 108
Stat. 4809, 4973–90 (1994). For a discussion of the TRIPs Agreement and its effect on
U.S. patent law, see, for example, Kenneth J. Burchfiel, U.S. GATT Legislation Changes
Patent Term, 77 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 222 (1995); Charles E. Van Horn, Effects of GATT and NAFTA on PTO Practice, 77 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 231
(1995).
154
Adamasu, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37769, at *3.
155
Id. at *3–4.
156
Id. at *4.
157
Id.
158
Id. at *5; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.137(d)(2) (2007) (“Any terminal disclaimer pursuant
to paragraph (d)(1) of this section must also apply to any patent granted on a continuing
utility or plant application filed before June 8, 1995 . . . that contains a specific reference
under 35 U.S.C. 120, 121, or 365(c) to the application for which revival is sought.”).
152
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claimed that defendants’ filing of the continued prosecution application was an error that shortened the patent term and resulted in a
loss of over five million dollars in royalties and licensing fees. 159
The defendants filed a notice of removal with the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, arguing that the court
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338 because the
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily required determination of the
scope of the claims in his patent. 160 According to the defendants,
to prove causation and damages, the plaintiff had to show that “any
company that would have paid him royalties or licensing fees
[was] selling or ha[d] sold a product that infringed his patent.” 161
Applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, the court treated the
case as a state tort action that did not arise under patent laws and
granted plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to a state court. 162
State courts reached similar conclusions even in cases that arguably turned on substantial issues of patent law. For example, in
New Tek Manufacturing, Inc. v. Beehner, 163 the Supreme Court of
Nebraska reviewed an appeal from a summary judgment for the
defendant patent attorney John A. Beehner (“Beehner”) in a legal
malpractice action. 164 To render a decision, the state district court,
as a part of “case within a case” proceedings, held an elaborate
Markman hearing 165 on claim construction to determine whether
the plaintiff would have been successful in a hypothetical infringement action but for the attorney’s professional negligence. 166
Since the plaintiff asserted a state law cause of action and sought
159

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
161
Id.
162
Id. at *8–11. “The complaint alleges one cause of action, namely legal malpractice,
which is a state-law tort claim.” Id. at *9. It is likely that defendants’ handling of their
notice to remove contributed to the court’s decision. As the court pointed out, the defendants failed to file “a copy of all process with the notice of removal” in compliance with
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), their notice of removal contained typographical errors in citations
and did not follow court’s motion practice guidelines. Id. at *6–7. In addition, defendants’ filing of a sur-reply did not follow the court’s local rules. Id. at *7.
163
New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner (New Tek), 702 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 2005).
164
Id. at 342.
165
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that
claim construction “is exclusively within the province of the court.”).
166
New Tek, 702 N.W.2d at 346.
160
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remedies under state law, the Supreme Court of Nebraska found no
basis for federal jurisdiction and held that patent law questions
were merely incidental to the case. 167 The state’s highest appellate
court, however, disagreed with the state district court’s patent
claim construction and reversed the summary judgment. 168
In Delta Process Equipment, Inc. v. New England Insurance
Co., 169 the Court of Appeals of Louisiana found federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) in a patent law malpractice case
where the defendant attorney failed to timely file a patent application, and the issued patent was therefore invalid because of the onsale statutory bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 170 Upon rehearing, however, the court reversed itself and held that under Christianson, the
plaintiff’s right to relief did not “necessarily depend on resolution
of a substantial question of federal patent law . . . .” 171
In a few legal malpractice cases, federal courts denied plaintiffs’ motions to remand to state courts. For example, in Chance v.
Sullivan, 172 clients sued their former attorneys in a state court alleging, inter alia, a breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice in
reaching a settlement agreement in the underlying federal litigation. 173 The defendants removed the malpractice action to the
same federal district court where they litigated the underlying action. 174 The court denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand and held
that it had federal question jurisdiction over the case because federal issues dominated the case and alternatively to protect the integrity of the court’s prior settlement order.175
Within the last few years, courts’ treatment of patent law malpractice cases started to change. In 2003, the U.S. District Court
167

Id.
Id. at 354–55. The court refused to consider Beehner’s purported cross-appeal beyond the issue of subject matter jurisdiction because, in filing his cross-appeal, Beehner
failed to comply with the requirements of NEB. CT. R. PRAC. 9D(4) (2001).
169
Delta Process Equip., Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 560 So. 2d 923 (La. Ct. App.
1990).
170
See id. at 923–24; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
171
Delta Process, 560 So. 2d at 926 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
486 U.S. 800 (1988)).
172
Chance v. Sullivan, 993 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
173
Id. at 567.
174
Id. at 566.
175
Id. at 568.
168
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for the Western District of Texas denied plaintiff’s motion to remand a patent law malpractice action to the state court where the
plaintiffs originally filed it. 176 The plaintiffs alleged that one of
the defendants, Gary Hamilton, failed to timely file a patent application and did not properly disclose relevant prior art to the PTO
while prosecuting patent applications for the plaintiffs. 177 This
malfeasance, according to the plaintiffs, forced them to settle the
subsequent infringement litigation for significantly less than would
have been otherwise possible. 178
The court held that in order to prevail, the plaintiffs had to establish that they would have prevailed in the underlying infringement action, but for Hamilton’s negligence that afforded the alleged infringers the defenses of on-sale bar and patent
invalidity. 179 Thus, according to the court, the plaintiffs’ right to
relief “necessarily depend[ed] on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law . . . .” 180 In denying plaintiffs’ motion to
remand, the court distinguished Commonwealth Film Processing 181 and Voight 182 as cases where the parties conceded all substantial patent law questions. 183
In 2005, another federal district court in Texas, without mentioning the Air Measurement decision, denied a motion to remand
a patent law malpractice case to a state court. In Groteapproach,
Ltd. v. Reynolds, 184 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) and the well-pleaded complaint
176

See Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Hamilton, No. SA-03-CA-0541, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16391, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2003). For the subsequent appellate history of
this case, see infra Part III.A.
177
Id. at *2.
178
Id. at *2–3.
179
Id. at *12–13.
180
Id. at *13 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809
(1988)).
181
Commonwealth Film Processing, Inc. v. Moss & Rocovich, P.C., 778 F. Supp. 283
(W.D. Va. 1991); see also supra note 147 and accompanying text.
182
Voight v. Kraft, 342 F. Supp. 821 (D. Idaho 1972); see also supra note 147 and accompanying text.
183
Air Measurement, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16391, at *10–12.
184
Groteapproach, Ltd. v. Reynolds, No. 3:04-CV-2735-BF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16362, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug 9, 2005).
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rule of Christianson. 185 The plaintiff, Groteapproach, Ltd., alleged
that the defendant attorney negligently missed a filing deadline for
a patent application. 186 The court reasoned that in order to prevail,
the plaintiff “must necessarily prove that it possessed something
patentable, and also that the deadline under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) was
missed.” 187 Therefore, the success of the plaintiff’s malpractice
claim necessarily depended “on a resolution of substantial questions of federal patent law,” and the court had “arising under” jurisdiction over the case. 188
In February of 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California also had to consider plaintiff’s motion to remand a patent law malpractice case to a state court. 189 The plaintiff in Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner LLP 190 sued
its former attorneys alleging negligence, dual representation of adverse interests, breach of contract, interference with prospective
economic advantage, and constructive fraud. 191 Relying on district
court decisions in Air Measurement and Groteapproach, the defendant argued that the federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case since its adjudication necessarily required “resolution of . . . substantial question[s] of federal patent
law. . . .” 192
In support of its motion to remand, Vaxiion cited 1897 and
1916 Supreme Court cases and claimed that the case only involved
a breach of contract and “a matter of science” that did not impli-

185

Id. at *3 (citing Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808–09).
Id. at *1.
187
Id. at *3. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) provides: “A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless . . . the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent in the United States . . . .”
188
Id. (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808–09).
189
See Vaxiion’s Motion for Remand, supra note 106.
190
Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner LLP, No. 07CV280-IEG, 2008 WL
538446 (S.D. Cal. Feb, 27 2008); see also supra Part I.C (discussing this case).
191
See Foley’s Opposition to the Motion to Remand, supra note 104, at 2.
192
Id. at 3–9 (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808–9). When the defendant removed
the case to a federal court, Air Measurement and Groteapproach appeals were pending
before the Federal Circuit.
186
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cate federal patent law. 193 Unable or unwilling to counter legal arguments in the Air Measurement and Groteapproach decisions,
Vaxiion moved to strike defendant’s citation of those two cases as
not published, and thus, not citable in the Ninth Circuit. 194
Judge Irma E. Gonzalez agreed with the defendants, and on
April 12, 2007, denied Vaxiion’s motions. 195 As of the time of this
writing, the case is still pending before the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California. 196
Cases discussed in this section show that, in the absence of
clear rules defining outer limits of federal subject matter jurisdiction, courts had to rely on general guidelines of Supreme Court
cases and persuasive authority of their sister courts’ decisions. 197
To provide guidance on jurisdictional issues, the Federal Circuit
accepted jurisdiction over appeals from district court decisions in
two legal malpractice cases against patent attorneys where the district courts asserted “arising under” jurisdiction over state actions. 198 The final part of the Comment discusses those two cases.

193

See Vaxiion’s Motion for Remand, supra note 106, at 3–4; Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Motion to Remand at 2–3, Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446 (No.
07CV280), 2007 WL 4597055.
194
Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Motion to Strike at 2–3, Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008
WL 538446 (No. 07CV280), 2007 WL 4597078. Apparently, Vaxiion’s counsel could
not even find Air Measurement and Groteapproach decisions until Foley’s counsel provided copies of the two decisions. See Defendant Foley & Lardner LLP’s Opposition to
Plaintiff Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc.’s Motion to Strike at 2 n.1, Vaxiion Therapeutics,
2008 WL 538446 (No. 07CV280), 2007 WL 4597084.
195
See Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446, at *2.
196
See Vaxiion Therapeutics, 2008 WL 538446, for docket information.
197
See, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP,
No. SA-03-CA-0541, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96914, at *10–14 (W.D. Tex. Sep, 29
2006).
198
See Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 206 F.
App’x 980, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (granting permission to appeal).
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III. EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION OF PATENT LAW
MALPRACTICE CASES: FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS IN AIR
MEASUREMENT 199 AND IMMUNOCEPT 200
A. Air Measurement Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss
Hauer & Feld, LLP
On October 15, 2007, the Federal Circuit decided two cases
where it held that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
state law legal malpractice cases that necessarily depend on a resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law. 201
In Air Measurement, discussed in the previous section, after
two years of discovery, the defendants, who originally removed the
case to the federal court, filed a motion to remand. 202 The plaintiffs, Air Measurement Technologies, Inc (“AMT”), opposed. 203
The court denied defendants’ motion to remand and granted its
motion to permit interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit. 204
According to the district court, the controlling question of law
on appeal was: “Whether a Texas state-law legal malpractice claim
arising out of underlying patent prosecution and patent litigation
necessarily raises a question of federal patent law, actually disputed and substantial, that a federal forum may entertain without
disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities.” 205 Granting the motion, the district
court emphasized a lack of controlling authority on point, “the
need for clarity in jurisdictional rules, and the amount of resources
frequently required to litigate complex patent-related cases.” 206
The certified question presented an issue of first impression to
the Federal Circuit. 207 Writing for the court, Chief Judge Michel
199

Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
200
Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
201
See id. at 1284; Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1265.
202
Air Measurement, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96914, at *5.
203
Id.
204
Id. at *17.
205
Id. at *16.
206
Id. at *17.
207
Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d
1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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started his analysis with the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule of Christianson and Holmes. 208 Since proof of patent
infringement was necessary to show that AMT would have prevailed in the underlying litigation but for the attorneys’ malpractice, patent infringement was a necessary element of plaintiffs’
malpractice claim, and therefore, this presented “a substantial
question of patent law conferring § 1338 jurisdiction.” 209 Citing
Grable, Judge Michel stated that it would be “illogical” for a district court “to have jurisdiction under § 1338 to hear the underlying
infringement suit and . . . not have jurisdiction under § 1338 to
hear the same substantial patent question in the ‘case within a case’
context of a state malpractice claim.” 210 This interpretation was
consistent with post-Christianson Federal Circuit cases, where the
court held that “patent infringement presents a substantial question
of federal patent law conferring ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.” 211
To prevail in its “case within the case,” in addition to infringement, AMT had to show that it would have prevailed over the defenses of patent invalidity and unenforceability in the underlying
litigation but for its attorneys’ malpractice. 212 This, according to
Judge Michel, also presented a substantial question of federal patent law sufficient to confer “arising under” jurisdiction. 213
Turning to the federalism analysis under Grable, Judge Michel
observed that “[t]here is a strong federal interest in the adjudication
of patent infringement claims in federal court because patents are
issued by a federal agency” and that litigants would “benefit from
federal judges who have experience in claim construction and infringement matters.” 214 In adopting 28 U.S.C. § 1338, Congress
decided the federal versus state jurisdictional issue in favor of ensuring uniformity of federal patent law. 215 Therefore, under
Grable, patent infringement, being a necessary element of this legal malpractice claim, presented a substantial issue of patent law
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id. at 1267–69.
Id. at 1269.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1272.
See id.
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sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. 216 In an apparent attempt
to limit the scope of its holding, the court, in conclusion, stated:
[W]e hold that at least where, as here, establishing
patent infringement is a necessary element of a
malpractice claim stemming from alleged mishandling of patent prosecution and earlier patent litigation, the issue is substantial and contested, and federal resolution of the issue was intended by
Congress, there is “arising under” jurisdiction under
§ 1338. 217
B. Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP 218
In Immunocept, the plaintiffs (“Immunocept”) appealed from a
summary judgment where the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas held that Immunocept’s legal malpractice claim
was foreclosed by the Texas two-year statute of limitations and
that the plaintiffs could not recover under Texas law because the
alleged damages were too speculative. 219 Immunocept claimed
that Fulbright’s patent attorney, who prosecuted one of Immunocept’s patents, erroneously used the restrictive “consists of” transitional phrase instead of open-ended “comprises,” thus rendering
the patent too narrow in scope and practically worthless. 220 Immunocept appealed to the Federal Circuit, and the appellate court
ordered both parties to address the issue of whether the district
court had “arising under” jurisdiction over the malpractice claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 221
In an opinion by Chief Judge Michel, the court stated that since
claim drafting errors were the sole basis for the legal malpractice
suit, they constituted an essential element of the malpractice cause
of action. 222 Therefore, Immunocept could not prevail without as216

See id.
Id.
218
Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, No. A-05-CA-334-SS, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 96912 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2006).
219
Id. at *4.
220
Id. at *3 (quoting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2).
221
Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1282–83 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
222
Id. at 1285.
217
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certaining the scope of the patent claims. 223 Further, since claim
construction was a question of law that determined the scope of
patent protection and could involve complex concepts of patent
law, it represented a substantial question of federal law. 224
Relying on its holding in Air Measurement and applying similar analysis, the court held that where the “determination of claim
scope is a necessary, substantial, and contested element of a malpractice claim stemming from patent prosecution, there is ‘arising
under’ jurisdiction under § 1338.” 225
C. Patent Law Malpractice Cases After Air Measurement and
Immunocept
It is difficult to predict how courts will interpret the Federal
Circuit decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept and
whether future cases will limit their effect. 226 Some industry observers and practicing attorneys have expressed concerns that these
decisions may lead to a wide variety of legal malpractice lawsuits,
not only those that involve substantial questions of patent law, being tried in federal courts instead of state courts. 227
For example, E. Joshua Rosenkranz, who represented Akin
Gump attorneys in the Air Measurement case and who argued the
case before the Federal Circuit, believes that the Federal Circuit
decision in Air Measurement “could lead to a deluge of state law
legal malpractice suits being filed in federal courts.”228 Rosenkranz even suggests that since there was federal jurisdiction in Air
Measurement, then all patent malpractice cases, as well any other

223

Id.
Id.
225
Id. at 1289.
226
For some early comments on the two Federal Circuit decisions, see Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Federal Circuit Finds Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction of Legal Malpractice
Cases Arising From Patent Matters (Nov. 13, 2007), http://www.hinshawlaw.com
/federal-circuit-finds-exclusive-federal-jurisdiction-of-legal-malpractice-cases-arisingfrom-patent-matters-11-13-2007.
227
See, e.g., Brenda Sapino Jeffreys & John Council, Federal Circuit: Legal-Mal Suits
With Patent Infringement Elements Belong in Federal Court, TEX. LAWYER, Oct. 22,
2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1192784614514.
228
Id.
224
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malpractice cases “in any matter involving a federal law or a federal agency” must be tried in federal courts. 229
In contrast, Paul Storm and Chris Kling, partners in the Dallas
law firm Storm LLP who represented AMT in Air Measurement,
do not believe that the Federal Circuit decision in Air Measurement
will have broad implications. 230 The holding in Air Measurement,
according to Kling, requires a “fairly unique fact pattern” to keep a
patent law malpractice lawsuit in a federal court. 231
Regardless of which predictions prove to be more accurate,
there are important public policy reasons for the uniform development and application of patent law. 232 Discussing adjudication of
patent-related matters in state courts, many commentators and academic writers expressed concerns about possible fragmentation of
patent law and the competency of state courts to decide substantial
patent-related issues—including legal malpractice cases that necessarily turn on substantial questions of patent law. 233 The Air
Measurement and Immunocept decisions asserted exclusive federal
jurisdiction over such cases.

229

Id.
Id.
231
Id.
232
See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15
(expressing congressional intent to “increase doctrinal stability in the field of patent law”
through the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and to reduce or
eliminate the widespread forum-shopping in the patent law area).
233
See, e.g., Mark J. Henry, State Courts Hearing Patent Cases: A Cry for Help to the
Federal Circuit, 101 DICK. L. REV. 41, 51 (1996) [hereinafter Henry, State Courts Hearing Patent Cases] (reviewing a number of improperly decided state patent-related cases
and arguing that state courts are incapable of adjudicating patent cases properly); Seymore, The Competency of State Courts, supra note 5, at 475 (arguing that legal malpractice cases that necessarily turn on substantial issues of patent law should be tried in federal courts); Dutch D. Chung, Note, The Preclusive Effect of State Court Adjudication of
Patent Issues and the Federal Courts’ Choice of Preclusion Laws, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
707, 755 (2000) (warning that through artful pleading plaintiffs can avoid federal jurisdiction and that “potentially shaky interpretation of state court judges on patent issues
will surely frustrate Congress’ intent to remove incentives for forum shopping that had
plagued the nation prior to the creation of the [Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit]”).
230
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Many commentators pointed out that complex patent cases present substantial challenges to the courts. 234 Federal courts are better prepared to adjudicate questions of patent law, and their decisions are subject to the appellate review by the Federal Circuit. 235
At the same time, there is no doubt that federal courts are competent and experienced in the adjudication of state law claims, including state law claims arising from attorneys’ malfeasance that
implicate laws of multiple states and pose complex choice of law
issues. 236
Trying legal malpractice cases involving substantial questions
of patent law in federal courts will serve the Congressional intent
of bringing uniformity into the U.S. patent law jurisprudence. 237
In this respect, the two Federal Circuit decisions will alleviate, albeit in a limited way, the negative impact of the Supreme Court
holding in Holmes on the consistent application of patent law. 238
Meanwhile, litigants in patent law malpractice cases have already started to take advantage of the Air Measurement and Immunocept decisions. Two days after the Federal Circuit rendered the
decisions, defendants in Berger v. Seyfarth Shaw, LLP 239 relied on
them to remove their case to a federal court.240 In Berger, two inventors of snowboard bindings alleged that their attorneys’ mistakes in patent prosecution and in subsequent patent infringement
litigation caused them more than seventy five million dollars in
damages. 241
234

See generally John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for Surviving Scary
Patent Cases, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413 (2003) (explaining why trying complex patent
cases may present substantial challenges to the courts).
235
See, e.g., Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1284
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
236
See supra Parts I.A and I.B for a discussion of how different states approach legal
malpractice claims and related choice of law issues.
237
See supra note 232.
238
See supra Part II.B (discussion of the Holmes case).
239
Berger v. Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, No. C 07-05279, 2008 WL 683425 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7,
2008).
240
Id. at *2; see also Zusha Elinson, $75 Million Suit Says Seyfarth Bungled IP Case,
RECORDER, Oct. 22, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1192784618782 [hereinafter Elinson, $75 Million Suit] (discussing Berger, 2008 WL 683425).
241
Berger, 2008 WL 683425, at *1–2; see also Elinson, $75 Million Suit, supra note
240.
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In Chopra v. Townsend, Townsend and Crew LLP, 242 the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against his patent attorneys in a
federal district court and relied on Air Measurement and Immunocept to show that the court had jurisdiction to hear the case.243 The
plaintiff claimed that the attorneys “failed to respond to Office Actions from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, . . .
abandoned his patent applications,” and thus, gave a plaintiff’s
competitor an opportunity to obtain patents that cover the same
technology. 244
Despite predictions that all patent-related legal malpractice
cases will be tried in federal courts, some federal district courts refused jurisdiction in such cases if all patent law issues had been resolved in the underlying actions. 245 For example, in Taylor v.
Kochanowski, 246 the plaintiff alleged that his attorneys made procedural errors in his patent infringement case against Daimler
Chrysler and one of its suppliers. 247 The court emphasized that, in
the underlying patent infringement action, the judge found as a
matter of law that the patent in question was not infringed, and on
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision. 248 Since no substantial questions of federal patent law remained at issue in this legal malpractice action, the court granted plaintiff’s motion to remand the case to a state court. 249
Similarly, in Porta Stor, Inc. v. Pods, Inc., 250 the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed a patent law
malpractice action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because,
242

Chopra v. Townsend, Townsend & Crew LLP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13471 (D.
Col. 2008).
243
Id. at *1–2.
244
Id.
245
See, e.g., Eddings v. Glast, No. 3:07-CV-1512-L, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48589
(N.D. Tex. June 24, 2008) (declining federal jurisdiction over a patent law legal malpractice case where the plaintiffs alleged that procedural errors of their attorneys led to a
higher judgment against them in the underlying patent case and where plaintiffs’ theory
of recovery did not depend on a substantial issue of patent law).
246
Taylor v. Kochanowski, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20430 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
247
Id. at *2–3.
248
Id. at *5–6.
249
Id. at *6–8.
250
Porta Stor, Inc. v. Pods, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-0331, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22449
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2008).
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in the underlying patent infringement action, the court found accused device’s non-infringement of the patent in question, and no
unresolved questions of federal patent law were left for the court to
decide. 251
Moreover, in New Tek Manufacturing, Inc. v. Beehner, 252 discussed in Part II.C, after remand and another appeal, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska reasserted its jurisdiction over this patent law
malpractice action. 253 The court acknowledged the Federal Circuit
decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept delivered after the
first appeal, stated that the case arose entirely under state law, and
proceeded with the analysis of the doctrine of equivalents and the
application of the prosecution history estoppel under federal patent
law. 254 In affirming summary judgment for the defense, the court
determined that the prosecution history estoppel would have barred
the underlying patent infringement claim. 255
On the other hand, there are indications that the effect of the
Federal Circuit decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept
may spread beyond patent law malpractice cases. In Nash v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC, 256 a wrongful death action that included
violation of civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court
cited Air Measurement in denying plaintiff’s motion to reconsider
its previous decision to deny plaintiff’s motion to remand that was
issued before the Federal Circuit decision in Air Measurement. 257
D. Good News for Patent Attorneys and Their Insurance Carriers
Federal Circuit decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept
may be good news for patent law practitioners and their insurance
251

Id. at *27–28.
New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner (New Tek), 702 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 2005).
253
New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner (New Tek I), 751 N.W.2d 135, 144 (Neb. 2008).
254
Id. at 144–51.
255
Id. at 151.
256
Nash v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC (Nash), No. 07-4065-JAR, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79402 (D. Kan. Mar. 7, 2007).
257
Id. (denying a motion to reconsider the order denying a motion to remand); see also
Nash v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC (Nash I), No. 07-4065-JAR-JPO, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75874 (D. Kan. Sept. 12, 2007) (denying a motion to remand). Later the plaintiff
amended the complaint by removing claims under federal law, and the court granted a
motion to remand. See Nash v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC (Nash II), No. 07-4065-JAR,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82926 (D. Kan. Nov. 6, 2007).
252
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carriers. On average, federal court litigation is more expensive,
takes more attorney time, has lower recovery to legal fees ratio,
and gives defendants better chances of success than similar litigation in a state court. 258
Some solo legal practitioners and small law firms who represent plaintiffs in legal malpractice suits already expressed concerns
about the necessity to litigate legal malpractice cases in federal
courts. 259 The prospect of litigating their patent law malpractice
suits in federal courts can compel plaintiffs to settle or may even
discourage some potential plaintiffs from pursuing their malpractice claims altogether.
CONCLUSION
Although the long-term effects of the Federal Circuit decisions
in Air Measurement and Immunocept are uncertain, the decisions
will definitely contribute to the uniformity and consistency in the
patent law area. Litigants in patent law malpractice cases will
benefit from the experience of federal courts in adjudicating complex matters of patent law. The decisions will also benefit patent
law practitioners and their malpractice insurance carriers since defendants in such actions have better chances of success in federal
courts.

258

See, e.g., Henry, State Courts Hearing Patent Cases, supra note 233, at 51 (noting
that plaintiffs prevail more often in state courts than in federal courts); Ted D. Lee & Ann
Livingston, The Road Less Traveled: State Court Resolution of Patent, Trademark, or
Copyright Disputes, 19 ST. MARY’S L.J. 703, 704 (1988) (noting that, in general, plaintiffs have better chances to win in state courts, and that state court litigation requires less
attorney’s time, costs less, and has higher yields than similar litigation in federal courts);
Elinson, $75 Million Suit, supra note 240 (reporting that attorneys who defend lawyers in
legal malpractice suits often prefer to remove malpractice cases to federal courts and that
federal courts are more willing than state courts to dismiss malpractice cases on summary
judgments).
259
See, e.g., Elinson, $75 Million Suit, supra note 240.

